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THE INDEPENDENT DIRECTOR AND EFFECTIVE CORPORATE   
                                 GOVERNANCE 
 
                                
                                        ABSTRACT 
 
As a response to the rash of scandals in particularly USA and Europe in 
recent times, corporate governance has elicited a lot of interest 
worldwide. Today there is growing dialogue among the different 
stakeholders about corporate governance and how it should evolve to 
cope with the increasingly dynamic and global nature of our capital 
markets. Worldwide, corporate reforms and other initiatives are being 
taken as remedies to rebuild trust in corporate governance. Corporate 
reforms have led to the introduction in many countries of various codes 
or guidelines for best practices in corporate governance. 
 
Until now, probably the most important basic ingredient of these reform 
initiatives has been the emergence of the ‘independent director’. The 
introduction of this concept of independent director is at the heart and 
soul of corporate governance.1 Although the relevance or otherwise of 
this class of director to corporate success has been the subject of robust 
discourse, it is generally accepted that a ‘lack of monitoring by 
independent, disinterested non-executive directors has been a major 
cause for the various corporate scandals that we have witnessed’.2  
 
The first section of this study attempts a comparative analysis of various 
definitions (taken from corporate governance codes of various countries) 
of the independent director, taking a look at his role within the corporate 
structure. The second part examines the rationale for including the 
                                                 
1
 OECD, Corporate Governance of Non-Listed Companies in Emerging Markets,(2006),p.172 
2
. L.A.A. Van den Berghe … 
  
viii 
viii 
independent director on the board, his effectiveness, and his relevance in 
relation to corporate performance.  
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PART 1 
 
CHAPTER ONE 
THE INDEPENDENT DIRECTOR 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Corporate governance is a term that has been in circulation for the last twenty or so years. 
It has elicited a lot of attention in recent times and like many fashionable concepts, it is 
somewhat ambiguous and, to some, has become a bit of a cliché, an abstraction that 
commands near-universal respect but suffers from diverse interpretation.3It is believed in 
certain circles that the term ‘entered into prominent usage in the mid to late 1970s in the 
United States in the wake of the Watergate scandal and the discovery that major 
American corporations had engaged in secret political contributions and corrupt 
payments abroad. Eventually, it also gained currency in Europe as a concept separate 
from corporate management, company law or corporate organisation”.4 
 
The fundamental problem of corporate governance however, can be traced back to what 
is now known as the ‘separation theory’ as proposed by Adolf Berle and Gardener 
Means, in their classically famous work ‘The Modern Corporation and Private 
Property’.5This is the theory that, in the modern corporation, there has arisen a 
‘separation of ownership by passive shareholders from control by a small self-
perpetuating management group’.6 The small group of managers are relatively free to 
manage the publicly held corporation as they deem fit (for their own benefit), not that of 
the powerless and passive shareholders.7 Berle and Means proffer that, there is a 
significant divergence of interest between ownership and control of the modern 
corporation. The authors examined the nature of control exercised over the 200 largest 
American corporations at the beginning of the 1930s. They concluded that 65 percent of 
                                                 
3
. Kevin Keasey et al, Corporate Governance: Accountability, Enterprise and International Comparisons 
.(2005) Pg.1. 
4
. Jeswald W Salacuse, ‘Corporate Governance in the New Century’ (2004) The Company Lawyer, Vol. 
25, N0. 3, Pg. 70. 
5
  Adolf Berle and Gardener Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property Revised ed (1991). 
6
. Nicholas Wolfson The Modern Corporation (1984) Pg.13. 
7
. Wolfson op cit note 4 at pg 4. 
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the companies and 80 percent of their combined wealth were controlled by the 
management or by a legal device (e.g., voting trusts or non-voting stock) involving a 
small proportion of ownership.8 
 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: AN OVERVIEW 
 
Various definitions of corporate governance have been advanced by corporate 
governance practitioners, scholars and commentators alike. In a narrow sense, it has been 
defined as ‘the system of rules and institutions that determine the control and direction of 
the corporation and that define relations among the corporation’s primary 
participants’.9In other words, corporate governance is the system by which companies are 
directed and controlled,10 the primary concern being with those who supply finance to 
companies, the shareholders. This view sees the corporate objective as being primarily 
that of preservation and maximisation of shareholder investment. This theory is 
sometimes referred to as the ‘shareholder theory’ of corporate governance. 
 
This ‘shareholder-centric’ approach to corporate governance is prominent in countries 
like the United States and the United Kingdom where the view is that the problem of 
corporate governance is that of ensuring that the corporation is managed in the best 
interest of the shareowners. The purpose of the corporation is to make profits and the 
beneficiaries of those profits are the shareholders. In such countries that are characterised 
by a widely dispersed share ownership structure the principal focus of corporate 
governance is to define the relationship between the three primary participants in the 
corporation: shareholders, the board of directors and company management.11This is 
again sometimes referred to as the Anglo-American model of corporate governance.   
 
In a more broad sense, corporate governance has been defined as, the rules and ‘the 
institutions that influence how business corporations allocate resources and returns’ and 
                                                 
8
. Wolfson op cit at pg.13. 
9
  Salacuse note 2 at pg.70. 
10
. Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (Cadbury Report), Para. 
2.5, available at www.ecgn.org.  
11
. Salacuse note 2 at pg.74 
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‘the organisations and rules that affect expectations about the exercise of control of 
resources in firms’.12 It includes the entire network of formal and informal relations 
involving the corporate sector and their consequences for society in general. In other 
words, corporate governance is concerned with holding the balance between economic 
and social goals and running the company as a community, for the benefit of all 
stakeholders, including shareholders, employees, creditors, suppliers, and the society at 
large.13 By this approach, corporate governance seeks to align the interests of the 
corporation with those of society. This is sometimes referred to as the ‘stakeholder 
theory’ of corporate governance. 
 
This ‘stakeholder’ approach to corporate governance is quite prominent in Continental 
Europe especially in countries like France and Germany, and in Japan, which have 
corporate systems that are characterised by a more concentrated share ownership 
structure. For them, corporate governance is about society controlling corporations for 
purposes of social welfare (corporate social responsibility).14 Companies are considered 
to be social institutions with responsibilities and accountability, and corporate objectives 
also involve advancing the interests of other groups - like employees and the wider 
community in general - beyond the traditional category of shareholders. 
 
The heightened attention to corporate governance was caused in part by the rash of high 
profile frauds and scandals that have plagued corporations, especially in recent times. 
Ever since the failures in Polly Peck, Guinness, Maxwell and BCCI in Europe, corporate 
governance had been an increasing concern for those that control and direct companies, 
and indeed society at large, but the corporate failures and wrongdoing that have come to 
light since late 2001 have raised the temperature of the international corporate 
governance debate considerably. The abuses at Enron, Arthur Anderson, Tyco, Global 
Crossing, Adelphia and WorldCom in the United States, and at Ahold, Parmalat, One.Tel, 
HIH, Equitable and now Shell in Europe and other parts of the world, have severely 
                                                 
12Salacuse note 2 at pg. 70 
13
. Department of Trade and Investment Policy Report, pg.23, available at www.dti.co.za.  
14
. Salacuse, note 2 at pg 72. 
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impacted investor confidence in the integrity of those charged with the supervision and 
management of our larger companies.15 
 
At the root of these corporate failures are factors like executive greed, dishonesty, 
accounting defaults, insolvent trading, incompetence, excessive executive pay, lack of 
accountability and executive arrogance. Other factors underlying these collapses include 
passive boards of directors, poor management and auditing practices, breach of duty by 
directors, ostentation and waste. These factors, with their resulting consequences, were 
the major triggers for the global responses to, and attempts at, corporate governance 
reforms, particularly since late 2001.  
 
In the United States for instance, in the aftermath of the Enron scandal, the American 
Congress rapidly responded by passing the Public Company Accounting Reform and 
Investor Protection Act, popularly referred to as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, in 2002, which 
‘tightened regulations on a public company accounting oversight board, auditor 
independence, corporate responsibility, white collar crime penalties, and fraud and 
accountability’16. In other words it was designed to facilitate the tightening of accounting 
standards and enhance external auditor independence from management. It was the first 
new piece of business regulatory legislation for more than half a century and is 
considered by many to be the biggest overhaul of U.S. securities regulations.17 The New 
York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the NASDAQ also adopted new rules giving a greater 
role to independent directors of listed companies.18 
 
In the United Kingdom which has had its own share of corporate failures, various 
committees were commissioned to make recommendations on best practices in different 
aspects of business practice. The corporate governance structures and practices within 
UK companies have undergone significant changes in response to the recommendations 
                                                 
15
. J.Farrar, Corporate Governance in Australia and New Zealand (2001)  
16
. Gerald Acquaah-Gaisie,’Toward more Effective Corporate Governance Mechanisms’, Australian 
Journal of Corporate Law, (2005), Vol.18, pg.19. 
17
. Fred Robins, ‘Corporate Governance after Sarbanes Oxley: An Australian Perspective’ Corporate 
Governance, Vol.6 No.1, (2006).  
18
. George W. Dent,’Coporate Governance: Still Broke, No Fix in Sight,’ The Journal of Corporation Law, 
(2005), Vol.31, pg.42. 
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of these committees. Concerns over poor corporate governance standards led to the 
setting up of the first corporate governance committee, the Cadbury Committee on the 
Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, in 1991. The committee’s terms of reference 
were ‘to review those aspects of corporate governance specifically related to financial 
reporting and accountability.’19Its report incorporating a code of best practice for all 
listed companies (the Cadbury Code of Best Practice) was published in 1992. 
 
As a response to public concerns over high levels of directors’ remuneration, the Study 
Group on Directors’ Remuneration (The Greenbury Committee) was formed to identify 
good practices in determining directors’ remuneration. Its report and code of best practice 
on the determinants of directors’ remuneration was published in July 1995.20Further, in 
November 1995, the Committee on Corporate Governance (The Hampel Committee) was 
established. This committee published a set of principles and a code which incorporated 
its recommendations and those of the Cadbury and Greenbury committees. The 
‘Combined Code’ as it is known, has been adopted by the London Stock Exchange, 
which listing rules require companies to report on their compliance with the code. 
 
In South Africa, corporate governance was institutionalised with the publication of the 
‘King Report on Corporate Governance’ in November 1994.21 The King Committee on 
Corporate Governance was formed under the auspices of the Institute of Directors of 
Southern Africa, to consider corporate governance in the context of South Africa.22 The 
purpose of the report was to promote the highest standards of corporate governance in 
South Africa, and it contained a Code of Corporate Practices and Conduct intended to 
apply to all companies listed on the JSE Securities Exchange and to all large public 
companies in South Africa.23 A revised edition of the King report was issued in 2002, 
which is hereinafter referred to as King II. 
 
 
                                                 
19
. Keasey et al, op cit note 2 at pg.21 
20
. Austin & Ramsey Ford’s Principles of Corporations Law (2005), 12thEd. pg.322. 
21
. Mervyn King ‘Report on Corporate Governance for South Africa’ (2002) P. 5. 
22
. King, ibid.. 
23
. Blackman et al Commentary on The Companies Act
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EMERGENCE OF THE INDEPENDENT DIRECTOR 
 
The notion of the independent director has become something of a theme song among 
corporate governance scholars and commentators worldwide. The concept has also 
received wide acceptance in the business and corporate community. Indeed, there have 
been proposals to the effect that all of the board, except the chief executive officer, of a 
company, be made up of independent directors. While some would go that far, there are 
many who believe that at least a significant number of independent directors should be on 
the board. In his book on corporate governance best practices, Frederick Lipman 
recommends that governing bodies of all organisations, whether designated as boards of 
directors or not, should include completely independent directors and these directors 
should preferably constitute a majority of all directors.24 
 
A study of legislation and other instruments of corporate governance globally reveals the 
significant support that this notion of independent director enjoys. The Australian 
corporate governance code and the Combined Code of the U.K. for instance, both require 
that the board be constituted of a good proportion of independent directors. The two 
codes also contemplate a major role for such directors by providing that certain board 
committees like audit, nomination and remuneration committees, be constituted by a 
majority of independent directors. Indeed, in Australia, nine of 12 major institutional 
investors considered it important that a listed company have some independent directors 
on its board. They expressed a preference for the board to have a majority of independent 
directors.25 
 
In the US, the corporate governance rules of the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) 
require that the boards of listed companies must have a majority of independent directors. 
Requiring a majority of independent directors, the rules state, will increase the quality of 
board oversight and lessen the possibility of damaging conflicts of interest. The rules also 
require that all listed companies must have audit, compensation and nomination 
                                                 
24
. Frederick D. Lipman, Coporate Governance Best Practices (2006) P.9. 
25
. Ramsey et al, Institutional Investors’ views on Corporate Governance (1998) Pg.9. 
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committees composed entirely of independent directors. 26  Similarly, the corporate 
governance code of South Africa (King 11) recommends that corporate boards be 
comprised of a majority of independent non-executive directors.27 The corporate 
governance code for Nigerian banks released in April, 2006, also requires that the 
number of non-executive directors on the board must be more than executive directors 
and of these, at least two must be independent directors.28  
 
The International Corporate Governance Network (ICGN) in its statement on global 
corporate governance principles suggests that each board should include a ‘strong 
presence of independent non-executive directors with appropriate competencies’.29 In a 
similar tone, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 
its corporate governance principles states that in order to exercise its duties of monitoring 
managerial performance, preventing conflicts of interest, and balancing competing 
demands on the corporation, the board must be able to exercise objective judgement on 
corporate affairs. This will mean that a sufficient number of board members will need to 
be independent of management.30 The French Principles of Corporate Governance state 
that even though the quality of the board of directors cannot be defined simply by 
reference to a percentage of independent directors, it is important to have on the board a 
significant proportion of independent directors not only to satisfy an expectation of the 
market but also to improve the quality of proceedings.31  
 
As earlier stated, there is a trend toward greater independence on corporate boards, 
whatever the benefits may be, and most commentators applaud this trend.  Major 
institutional investors such as the California Public Employees’ Retirement System 
                                                 
26
. New York Stock Exchange (NYSC) ‘Corporate Governance Rules’. Available at 
www.nyse.com/finalcorpgovrules.  
27
. King op cit note 19 at P.24. 
28
. Code of Best Practices on Corporate Governance for Banks in Nigeria Post Consolidation, (2006) – 
available at www.cenbank.org/ng.  
29
. International Corporate Governance Network Statement on Global Corporate Governance Principles 
available at www.icgn.org.  
30
. Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) ‘Principles of Corporate 
Governance’ (2004), P.63. Available at www.oecd.org.  
31
. European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ‘The Corporate Governance of Listed Corporations’ 
(2003), Principle 8.2, P.9. Available at www.ecgi.org/codes.  
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(CalPERS), which is the largest public pension fund in the US, and institutional investor 
representative bodies like the Alternative Investment Management Association (AIMA) 
and the Investment and Financial Services Association (IFSA) both in Australia, do 
believe that independent directors are value-adding, and have been high profile 
proponents of them.32 The corporate governance principles and guidelines of CalPERS 
states: 
 
                  Independence is the cornerstone of accountability…it is now widely recognised throughout the 
US that independent boards are essential to a sound governance structure. At a minimum, a 
majority of the board should consist of directors who are independent. Boards should strive to 
obtain board composition made up of a substantial majority of independent directors.33  
 
However, whether increasing the number of independent directors on boards would 
translate automatically to better corporate performance is a whole different issue, which 
will be tackled later in this study. It is however necessary to take a look at the rationale 
for the introduction of independent directors on corporate boards. 
 
RATIONALE FOR INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS 
 
The separation of ownership (a company is believed to be owned by its shareholders) 
from control (but a company is controlled by managers who do not own it) in the modern 
public corporation has created agency costs that interfere with efficient corporate 
decision making.34These agency costs comprise (i) the costs incurred by shareholders in 
monitoring management in order to minimise the divergence between their interests;(ii) 
bonding costs incurred by managers;(iii) the residual loss resulting from the remaining 
divergence in shareholders’ and managers’ interests.35Indeed, the structure of the modern 
corporation holds obvious advantages for shareholders (as suppliers of capital) and 
managers. Shareholders can participate in the gains from entrepreneurial ventures even 
though they lack managerial skills. On the other hand, managers can pursue profitable 
                                                 
32
. Lawrence and Stapledon, ‘Do Independent Directors Add Value?’ (1999), Pg.6.  
33
. Available at www.calpers-governance.org/principles 
34
. Thomas W. Joo, Corporate Governance; Law, Theory and Policy (2004), P.330. 
35
. Lawrence and Stapledon, note 30 P.4.  
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business opportunities even though they lack large personal wealth. Both parties benefit 
from this division of labour.36 
 
However, as residual claimants on the firm’s income stream, shareholders want their 
agents - the firm’s managers - to maximise wealth. Because managers cannot capture all 
of the gains if they are successful, and will not suffer all of the losses should the venture 
flop, they have less incentive to maximise wealth than if they themselves were the 
principals. Rather, managers have an incentive to consume excess leisure, perquisites and 
in general be less dedicated to the goal of wealth maximisation than they would be if they 
were not simply agents.37 According to one commentator: 
 
 
Management develops the tendency to act in a self-serving manner because they only                    
receive a tiny fraction of profits generated by their activities since they rarely own a                     
substantial number of shares in such companies. They thus act in their own interest rather                    
than endeavour to maximise shareholder value. And to the extent that top executives pursue 
their own agenda rather than seeking to improve the profitability of the company, they impose 
what can be referred to as ‘agency costs’ on investors.38 
 
 
In an effort to reduce these agency costs a number of mechanisms were formulated to 
align the interests of non-owner management with that of shareholders. The introduction 
of the independent director was one of such mechanisms. The basis for this agency-cost 
rationale for the introduction of the independent director is that, in order for the board to 
properly exercise its oversight and monitoring role over management decisions and 
activities, there is need for outside directors to be independent of executive management 
and free from any business or other relationship with the company that could compromise 
their autonomy. It is believed that independent directors are in a better position to 
effectively monitor the executive management.39 
 
This agency-cost rationale for placing independent directors on corporate boards has been 
adopted by various promoters of board independence. The Cadbury Committee of the 
                                                 
36
. Lawrence and Stapledon ibid.   
37
. Lawrence and Stapledon, ibid. 
38
. Tshepo Mongalo, ‘The Emergence of Corporate Governance as a Fundamental Research Topic in South 
Africa’ (2003) Vol. 120 Issue 1 SALJ. 
39
. Lawrence and Stapledon note 30 at P.5. 
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U.K. for instance, views independent directors as particularly useful in reducing agency 
costs arising in areas such as takeovers, boardroom succession  and executive 
remuneration; 
    
               Non-executive directors have two particularly important contributions to make to the governance   
process as a consequence of their independence from executive responsibility. …The first is in 
reviewing the performance of the board and of the executive. …The second is in taking the lead 
where potential conflicts of interest arise. An important aspect of effective corporate governance 
is the recognition that specific interests of the executive management and the wider interests of 
the company may at times diverge, for example over takeovers, boardroom succession, or 
directors’ pay. Independent non-executive directors, whose interests are less directly affected, 
are well-placed to help to resolve such situations.40 
 
 
Similarly, the corporate governance guidelines of the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) state: 
               
               Independent board members can contribute significantly to the decision-making of the board. 
They can bring an objective view to the evaluation of the performance of the board and 
management. In addition, they can play an important role in areas where the interests of 
management, the company and shareholders may diverge such as executive remuneration, 
succession planning, changes of corporate control, takeover defences, large acquisitions and the 
audit function.41 
 
 
In Australia, the corporate governance guidelines published by the Alternative 
Investment Management Association (AIMA) in 1997 states that ‘if the majority of the 
board are genuinely independent they have the power to implement board decisions even 
contrary to the wishes of management or a major shareholder, if the need arises.’42The 
Corporate Governance code of South Africa also echoes the same theme when it states 
that non-executive directors bring an external judgement on issues of strategy, 
performance, resources, and standards of conduct and evaluation of performance.43 
 
Another rationale for the independent director that emerged from the OECD is that their 
inclusion on the board, as a mechanism of good corporate governance, is necessary for 
accessing international capital markets. According to the OECD, ‘investors increasingly 
                                                 
40
. Lawrence and Stapledon, ibid. 
41
. OECD ‘Guidelines on Corporate Governance for State-Owned Enterprises’. Available at 
www.oecd.org/documents.   
42
. Lawrence and Stapledon, note 30 at P.5. 
43
. King op cit note 19 at P.24.  
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rely on the corporate governance of the corporations they invest in, or lend to, to provide 
accountability and responsibility to the investors and, a failure to adapt to efficient 
governance practices may well lead to restricted access to capital markets.’44 Echoing the 
same theme, and indeed rightly underscoring the importance of good corporate 
governance practices, the OECD guidelines state: 
  
               The degree to which corporations observe basic principles of good corporate governance is an 
increasingly important factor for investment decisions. Of particular relevance is the relation 
between corporate governance practices and the increasingly international character of 
investment. International flows of capital enable companies to access financing from a much 
larger pool of investors. If countries are to reap the full benefits of the global capital market, and if 
they are to attract long-term “patient” capital, corporate governance arrangements must be 
credible and well understood across borders.45 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
44
. Lawrence and Stapledon, ibid. Pg.6. 
45
. OECD op cit note 39. Available at www.oecd.org/documents.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
               COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE CONCEPT OF INDEPENDENT 
DIRECTOR 
 
Corporate governance, as noted earlier, has in recent times elicited a lot of global 
attention. This has been mainly due to the many recent corporate failures which have in 
turn led to corporate governance reforms. A consequence of these reforms is the 
emergence of the independent director. The introduction of this concept of independent 
director is said to be at the heart and soul of corporate governance.46 There is no doubt 
that independence is critical to the attainment of effective corporate governance. In order 
for the board of directors to successfully perform its duty of effectively monitoring the 
decisions and activities of management, a high degree of independence and objectivity is 
required. The role of the independent director in corporate governance cannot therefore 
be over-emphasised.  
 
Before undertaking a comparative analysis of the definition of independent director in 
selected corporate governance Acts and guidelines, it is useful to canvass other 
definitions given to the concept. Indeed, ‘independent director’ is a somewhat ambiguous 
concept that defies a ‘one size fits all’ definition. It means different things to different 
commentators. It has been used interchangeably with terms like outside director, non-
executive director, non-interested director, non-management director, non-employee 
director, disinterested director etc. Each of these terms is defined differently and implies 
a different role for the director it describes, yet they are frequently discussed together as 
if they were all describing the same thing.47 
 
The Council of Institutional Investors describes the independent director as a person 
‘whose directorship constitutes his or her only connection to the corporation’. It defines 
him simply as one whose ‘only nontrivial professional, familial or financial connection to 
the corporation, its chairman, CEO or any other executive officer is his or her 
                                                 
46
. OECD, ‘Corporate Governance of Non-listed Companies in Emerging Markets’ (2006) P.172. Available 
at www.oecd.org.  
47
. Donald C. Clarke, ‘The Independent Director in Chinese Corporate Governance’, Delaware Journal of 
Corporate Law (2006) Vol.31 P.151. 
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directorship’. The members of the Council recognise that the independence of the 
director depends on all relationships the director has, including relationships between 
directors that may compromise the director’s objectivity and loyalty to shareholders.48 
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) on its part 
defines the independent director as one who is not the employee of the company and who 
is not closely related to the company or its management through significant economic, 
family or other ties.49 He or she is a non-executive director who ‘apart from receiving 
director’s remuneration, does not have any material relationship or transaction, of such 
amount as may be prescribed, with the company…apart from possessing such abilities for 
being treated as an independent director.’50 
 
Independent directors have further been described as a sub-group of non-executive 
directors (not all non-executive directors are independent) who are independent of 
management, influential shareholders and other conflicting interests such as staff, and  
suppliers of goods and services to the company and its group.51 In a similar tone, the 
French code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies defines the independent 
director as one ‘who has no relationship of any kind whatsoever with the corporation, its 
group or the management of either that is such as to colour his or her judgment’.52 He or 
she is not only to be understood as a non-executive director, but also ‘one devoid of any 
particular bonds of interest (significant shareholder, employee, other) with them’.53 One 
interesting definition of the independent director is that given by Donald C. Clarke in his 
article, ‘The Independent Director in Chinese Corporate Governance’.54 He states that an 
independent director is one who has no need or inclination to stay in the good graces of 
management and who will be able to speak out, inside and outside the boardroom, in the 
face of management misdeeds in order to protect the interests of shareholders. 
 
                                                 
48
. Council of Institutional Investors (CII) ‘Corporate Governance Policy’. Available at www.cii.org.  
49
. OECD op cit note 28. Available at www.oecd.org.  
50
. OECD op cit note 44 at P.172. Available at www.oecd.org.  
51
. EASD ‘Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations’ Recommendation VI.I.b. Available at 
www.ecgi.org/codes.  
52
. ECGI op cit note 29 Principle 8.1, Pg 9. Available at www.ecgi.org/codes.  
53
. ECGI Ibid.  
54
. Donald C. Clarke op cit note 45 at P.154. 
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KING II, AUSTRALIAN CODE, COMBINED CODE UK 
 
The corporate governance codes analysed for this study emanate from nations with 
diverse cultures, ownership structures, financing traditions and legal origins. Some of the 
codes represent the unitary (or one-tier) board system while others, like the German and 
French codes, represent the two-tier board system. Despite this diversity in origins, the 
codes are remarkable in their similarities, especially as regards their attitude towards key 
roles and responsibilities of the board and their recommendations concerning its 
structure, composition and practices. For instance, all the codes recognise both the 
supervisory and managerial functions of the board, even though the functions are made 
more distinct in the unitary codes. To reinforce the difference in both functions, the codes 
recommend the appointment of non-executive (or outside) directors who are independent 
from company management, to the board. They also propose the separation of the 
positions of chairman of the board and the CEO (or managing director). They recommend 
that the two positions be held by different individuals.55 
 
The codes also recommend the appointment of a senior (or lead) independent director on 
the board to serve as contact person or mediator when serious disagreements arise 
between executive and non-executive directors: and also during the performance 
evaluation of the chairman and board. Some, like the Australian code recommend that the 
chairman should be an independent director. They recommend a regular assessment of 
the independence of each director, and in this regard each director is to provide 
information concerning his interests to the board. Directors considered by the board to be 
independent must be identified and this information, along with reasons for such 
consideration are to be disclosed in the company annual report. By this approach, it is 
believed that investors will be better informed and equipped to assess the quality of the 
board’s independence and its independence standards. 
 
                                                 
55
. Some bodies like the Business Round Table in the U.S. believe that corporations are generally well 
served by a structure in which the CEO also serves as chairman. They believe that such a structure 
provides for a single leader with a single vision for the company, which results in a more effective 
organisation. – The Business Round Table ‘Statement on Corporate Governance’ 1997. Available at 
www.brt.org.  
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The codes also recognise that the supervisory role of the board is more effectively 
exercised through a committee structure. This is particularly in the areas where the 
interests of the company and that of management may tend to conflict, such as audit, 
nomination and remuneration. Not only do they recommend the setting up of audit, 
nomination and remuneration committees, but the codes also propose that independent 
directors play a significant role on these committees. For instance, the NYSE corporate 
governance rules require that each listed company must have audit, nomination/corporate 
governance and compensation committees, and that these committees must be composed 
entirely of independent directors. 
 
This part of the study attempts a comparative analysis of the ‘independent director’ as 
defined in selected corporate governance instruments. We start off by comparing the 
definitions of the concept in the South African code (King II), the Australian code and the 
UK combined code, which are all representative of the ‘unitary board’ structure that is 
predominant in the Anglo-American corporate system. Then we compare these with the 
definition as provided in the French code, which is representative of the ‘two-tier board’ 
structure predominant in Continental European corporate system.56 Finally, we take a 
look at the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) definition of the independent director as 
contained in the NYSE corporate governance rules. 
 
With respect to strengthening board independence, most of these codes adopt a two-fold 
approach. On the one hand, they advocate an increase in the proportion of independent 
directors sitting on the board and its committees. On the other hand, they adopt a more 
extensive and restrictive definition of independence. This seems to express a strong 
belief, present throughout the business community, in the potential of the independent 
director as a solution to the problem of corporate governance. As a result, expectations 
with regard to independent directors are soaring, although it is still a question mark 
whether greater board independence translates to better corporate performance.57  
 
                                                 
56
. In France, both the unitary and two-tier board systems are practiced. 
57
. L.A.A. Van den Berghe and Tom Baelden, ‘The Complex Relation between Director Independence and 
Board Effectiveness’, Corporate Governance, (2005) Vol.5, N0.5, P.59.  
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One observation that can be gleaned from an examination of these definitions is that they 
are formulated in a negative way and list elements that disqualify a director from being 
considered as independent. They list those elements that prevent a director from being 
independent. Instead of giving a positive definition of what constitutes independence, 
they mostly give a list of circumstances or relationships that imply non-independence.58 
The Combined Code and French code definitions are exceptions in this regard. What they 
do is list a number of criteria which could be relevant in determining whether a director 
qualifies as independent. They list a number of circumstances, the existence of which 
may be relevant in determining a director’s independence. They therefore give corporate 
boards certain latitude to determine director independence by considering the peculiar 
circumstances and relationships of director’s individually. This means that the existence 
of any of the circumstances listed, would not automatically render a director independent, 
or disqualify him from being considered independent. The specific circumstances and 
relationships surrounding each director would have to be considered individually by the 
board in making a determination.  
 
Another observation from the definitions is that they approach the concept of 
independence from a structural point of view, ‘in a sense that independence seems to 
equal being constantly in a position free of any possible conflict of interest’.59 They seem 
to follow a more formal approach. Other factors relevant to independence like character, 
attitude and judgment, have not been considered. Instead the focus is on those 
requirements, and the circumstances that are capable of raising conflicts between the 
personal interests of the independent director and those of the management.60 The 
combined code however seems to acknowledge the importance of these other ‘soft’ 
elements of independence when it states that ‘the board should determine whether the 
director is independent in character and judgment and whether there are relationships or 
circumstances which are likely to affect, or could appear to affect, the director’s 
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judgment’.61 Some of the other codes also acknowledge the fact that independence cannot 
be based solely on compliance with these formal requirements. Indeed, some of the 
recent corporate scandals have shown that the mere presence of formally independent 
directors without these ‘soft’ elements, like independent attitude and strong character, 
will not prevent future breaches of corporate governance.62 According to the NYSE rules;        
               
               No code of business conduct and ethics can replace the thoughtful behaviour of an ethical 
director, officer or employee. However such a code can focus the board and management on 
areas of ethical risk, provide guidance to personnel to help them recognise and deal with ethical 
issues, provide mechanisms to report unethical conduct, and help to foster a culture of honesty 
and accountability.63 
 
A close examination of the South African, U.K and Australian definitions of the 
independent director will reveal that they are quite similar in structure. They each contain 
seven different circumstances or elements, the existence of which could qualify a director 
as independent. As a starting point, the three definitions agree that an independent 
director is a non-executive director. In other words, an independent director is not a full-
time salaried employee of the company or the group, and therefore is not involved in its 
day to day management.64 This is of course the basis upon which independence can be 
assessed in the first place, for the concept of independence connotes separation 
(independence) from executive management. It must be also borne in mind that not all 
non-executive directors can be considered to be independent. 
 
While the King II and Australian definitions agree that an independent director must not 
have been employed in an executive capacity by the company or group in the three years 
preceding his appointment as director, the combined code provides that whether he has 
been an employee of the company or group within the last five years is an element which 
is relevant to determining if a director is to be considered independent, by the board. The 
requirement under the combined code is obviously wider in scope.  The definition gives 
the board certain latitude in determining independence of a director. In other words, such 
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. The Combined Code of Corporate Governance UK (2006) p.6. Available at 
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director may have been an executive employee of the company but could still be 
considered to be independent. This may sound ironic for it is quite logical to assume that 
a director who has held an executive employment within the last three or five years 
would be non-independent. Indeed, there would most likely arise conflict of interest 
situations in such circumstances and it is difficult to see how such a director would still 
be able to act independently, having been an executive ‘insider’. The board is however, 
expected to examine the particular circumstance of such prior employment in order to 
decide on such director’s independence, for indeed where the employment was in a non-
executive capacity, it could be assumed that the director would be independent, the 
important factor being the holding of prior employment in an executive capacity. 
 
It should be noted that while King II and the Australian definitions provide for a three 
(financial) year look back period, the combined code provides for a five year period, 
which is consistent with the five year look back period of the Council of Institutional 
Investors 2006 director independence standards.65 The Australian definition adds that an 
independent director must not have been a director after ceasing to hold any such 
employment with the company. This could mean that an independent director will not be 
considered as such where he had been a director of the same company in a non-executive 
capacity in the preceding three years. 
 
King II and the Australian code also define an independent director as one who has no 
significant contractual relationship with the company or group, and who is not a major 
supplier to, or customer of the company or group. The Australian definition extends this 
by adding that such director must also not be an officer of, or associated with a material 
supplier or customer of the company or group. This could mean that under King II, an 
independent director, though not a major supplier or customer could still be an officer of 
or associated with, a major supplier or customer of the company. The Australian 
definition is more practical in this regard, for the goal is to minimise as much as possible, 
situations that could impair a director’s independent judgment. Other indirect 
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associations with suppliers or customers are still capable of causing a conflict between 
the personal interests of the director and those of the company.  
 
Both King II and the Australian definitions provide for what could be termed an 
‘omnibus criteria’, where it states that an independent director must be free from any 
business interests or relationship that could reasonably be seen or perceived to interfere 
with his ability to act in an independent manner or in the interest of the company. The 
critical element in this provision is not necessarily the existence of such relationship or 
interest; rather it is the materiality of such relationship or interest that counts. Is it such 
that could interfere with the director’s capacity to act independently? This provision, it 
would seem, covers every other kind of indirect relationship which is not covered by any 
of the other elements. For instance, a situation where such director has an interest in, or a 
relationship with a political or charitable organisation that receives support from the 
company would fit in here. In such instance, it would have to be determined how material 
the director’s links are as to affect his ability to act independently and in the company’s 
interest. The combined code does not seem to contain any such provision in its definition. 
 
The combined code provides to the effect that an independent director may not be a 
representative of a significant shareholder. King II defines such director as one who is not 
a representative of a controlling shareowner, while in the Australian code, he is not a 
substantial shareholder of the company or an officer, or otherwise associated directly 
with, a substantial shareholder of the company. This could be interpreted to mean that 
under the combined code and King II definitions, an independent director could be a 
significant shareholder himself or an officer of a significant shareholder.66 If this was the 
intention of the drafters of these codes then the aim would be defeated for the whole idea 
behind this element of the definition is to ensure that the independent director in 
performing his duties would not act to protect the interests of only a constituency of 
shareholders, to wit, controlling shareholders. He is expected to be independent of 
                                                 
66
. ‘In the U.K. where shareholding is relatively widely dispersed, shareholding is not generally viewed as 
impeding director independence; some would argue that shareholding aligns directors’ interests with 
those of the entire shareholding body’ – Weil, Gotshal and Manges, ‘Comparative Study of Corporate 
Governance Codes Relevant to the European Union and Its Member States’ Final Report, 2002. 
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management in order to be able to protect the interests of all shareholders, and not a 
section of them. It would be difficult to achieve this where the director himself is a 
significant shareholder or an officer of a significant shareholder.67 Indeed, there would be 
a conflict of interest in such a situation. This is not to say by any means that the 
independent director should be more disposed to act in the interest of shareholders. 
Indeed independent directors, by their personal qualities should not be different from 
other directors. The interests of the shareholders as a whole should ideally be represented 
by all directors.  
 
Another element of the King II definition is that an independent director must not be a 
professional advisor to the company or group. The Australian code more elaborately 
provides that he must not have, within the preceding three years, been a principal or 
employee of a material professional adviser or consultant to the company or group. The 
use of the word ‘material’ presupposes that there are professional advisers and 
consultants that are considered to be non-material. In other words, maintaining links with 
such may not be detrimental to the company or the director’s sense of independence. 
Therefore, such director may still be considered to be independent even where he is a 
principal or employee of a non-material professional adviser or consultant to the 
company. Again, the objective of this element it would seem is to avert the conflict of 
interest problem, and therefore lack of independence that would almost certainly arise 
where a director is also an adviser or consultant to the company. The Combined Code is 
silent on this issue.  
 
However, the Combined Code states that an independent director must not have, or have 
had, within the last three years, a material business relationship with the company either 
directly, or as a partner, shareholder, director or senior employee of a body that has such 
a relationship with the company. The problem here is that it is difficult, if not impossible, 
to determine what could constitute a ‘material business relationship’ for it could include 
legal, commercial, consulting or even a familial relationship. All relevant circumstances 
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of a particular director’s business relationships would have to be taken into consideration 
in order to determine whether they are material enough as to interfere with his sense of 
independence or lead to a conflict of interests. 
 
One element of the Australian definition which does not appear in King II is that an 
independent director must not have served on the board for a period which could, or 
could reasonably be perceived to, materially interfere with the director’s ability to act in 
the best interests of the company. The question that arises is what constitutes a reasonable 
period that could materially affect a director’s sense of independence? What is reasonable 
in one particular circumstance may not be reasonable in another. The Combined Code is 
more specific when it provides to the effect that serving more than nine years from the 
date of first election would be relevant to the determination of a director’s independence. 
This is consistent with the definition of the NAPF68 which states that an independent 
director must not have served as non-executive director for more than three 3 year terms 
(nine years).  
 
King II provides that an independent director must not be a member of the immediate 
family of an individual who is, or has been in any of the past three financial years, 
employed by the company or the group in an executive capacity. The combined code 
similarly provides that having close family ties with any of the company’s advisers, 
director’s or senior employees would be relevant in determining a director’s 
independence. The Australian definition has no such provision. However, it is stated 
elsewhere that family ties and cross-directorships may be considered as interests and 
relationships which may compromise independence.  
 
It is difficult to explain exactly what constitutes ‘family ties’. It is quite an ambiguous 
and generic term. Does it mean immediate family members only or does it include other 
extended family relatives? King II is more explicit when it states ‘…is not a member of 
immediate family’. There’s also the question of what constitutes ‘immediate family’. 
Some define it to include spouse, parents, children, siblings, mothers and fathers-in-law, 
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sons and daughters-in-law, brothers and sisters-in-law, and anyone who shares such 
person’s home.69 However, whether extended or immediate family ties, it may be safe to 
assume that, for this purpose what is to be considered are such family links that are 
capable of interfering with a director’s independent judgment. The board would have to 
consider individual circumstances of each director in this regard. 
 
The combined code definition also provides that an independent director must not receive 
additional remuneration apart from his director’s fees nor must he participate in the share 
option or a performance-related pay scheme of the company. He must also not be a 
member of the company’s pension scheme. Receiving additional remuneration or other 
compensatory benefits apart from his fees as director could certainly affect the director’s 
sense of judgement. It is however difficult to see how participating in the company’s 
share options would interfere with his independence. If anything, share options should 
operate as an incentive for aligning the interests of directors with those of the 
shareholders, and therefore leading to greater independence from management. This 
could also be seen as a solution to the agency problem in corporate governance brought 
about by the separation of control from management.70  
 
One other element in the Combined Code definition is that the independent director must 
not hold cross-directorships or have significant links with other directors through 
involvement in other companies or bodies. The element of cross-directorships also 
features in the Australian definition. It is logical to argue that the holding of cross-
directorships is capable of compromising a director’s sense of independence. For 
instance, where the director also sits on the board of a competing company, there’s no 
doubt that this is a signal for potential conflict of interest. It is difficult, if not impossible 
to see how such director would be able to honour his fiduciary duty of acting in the best 
interest of the company ‘at all times’ without there arising conflict situations and 
ultimately lack of independence. There lies the potential danger in holding cross-
directorships.  
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It is however difficult to anticipate or provide for all circumstances or relationships that 
could amount to ‘significant links’ with other directors. In today’s business circles, most 
directors are known to have multiple business relationships among themselves and 
involvements in different companies. This is particularly in countries where the pool of 
corporate directors is limited to a small group of individuals. In such countries it is 
common to find one individual holding as many as four or five directorship positions at 
the same time.71 Board memberships tend to be rotated among the same crop of 
individuals and as a result, collegial bonds, both business and casual are formed between 
them. Some of these relationships are significant and indeed end up having a negative 
impact on the exercise of objective and independent judgment by these directors, 
especially where vested interests must be protected. Indeed, the independence of a 
director should depend on all relationships the director has, including relationships with 
other directors, which may compromise the director’s objectivity and loyalty to the 
company.72 
 
FRENCH CODE   VS.  NYSE RULES 
 
This part of the study is an analysis of the definition of independent director as contained 
in the French Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Corporations, on the one hand, 
and the definition as contained in the NYSE Corporate Governance Rules, on the other 
hand. One important point to note is that the NYSE rules are of a mandatory character, 
and therefore companies listed on the exchange are required to comply with its 
provisions.73 This is different from the French code which is of a voluntary character. 
While the NYSE can sanction companies that do not comply with the provisions of its 
corporate governance rules,74 the provisions of the French code, and most other codes, 
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are recommendations that are, at the most, of a persuasive character. Companies may 
elect to observe their recommendations or not. This trend is however fast changing as in 
many jurisdictions now, stock exchange rules require companies to disclose their level of 
compliance with standards as proposed in these codes.75 In such jurisdictions, non-
compliant companies could be sanctioned for not adopting universally accepted corporate 
governance standards. This is apart from the fact that owners of capital would prefer to 
invest in companies with good corporate governance practices. 
 
Another observation is that the NYSE definition tends to equate the independence of a 
director to the amount of monetary compensation he receives from the company. In 
determining the independence of a director, emphasis is placed on the amount of 
compensation he or his family member receives from the company, or on his relationship 
with another company that receives or makes payments to his company. This attitude of 
the NYSE definition may not be unconnected with the recent upsurge in executive 
remuneration in the US and other parts of the world.  Indeed, factors such as excessive 
executive remuneration, executive greed and ostentation have been identified as some of 
the underlying causes of recent corporate failures. This attitude can also be seen in the 
Sarbanes Oxley Act76 and the Securities Exchange Act77 which define an independent 
director (for audit committee purposes only) as one who accepts no compensation from 
the company other than a director’s fees and is not an ‘affiliated person’ of the company 
or any of its subsidiaries.  This attitude of the NYSE is quite different from the French 
and other definitions which tend to focus more on the director’s relationships with other 
stakeholders or bodies linked to the company in one way or another, and which may or 
may not necessarily involve any monetary compensation. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
officer of the listed company becomes aware of any material non-compliance with any applicable 
provisions of the rules. 
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Another observation worth mentioning about the NYSE independent director definition is 
that each of the criteria contains a three-year ‘look-back’ period.78 In other words, when 
determining whether a director is independent with regard to a particular criterion of the 
definition, the board must consider the director’s relationships or interests in the three 
years immediately preceding the determination. The French definition on the other hand, 
contains a five-year ‘look-back’ period.79 Whether five years or three years, what is 
critical is the materiality of the particular relationship or interest under consideration, and 
whether it is such that could hinder the director from acting in an independent manner. 
The board must examine the peculiar circumstances of each director in this regard. This 
is necessary because merely satisfying the ‘look-back’ requirement will not automatically 
guarantee a director’s independence. Despite having met the formal criteria, such director 
may still be unable to display an independent attitude or objective judgement when 
dealing with corporate decisions. As earlier stated, there is more to independence than a 
mere satisfaction of a set of formal criteria. 
 
Another interesting feature of the NYSE definition is that it also covers the immediate 
family members of the director. In other words, in determining the independence of a 
particular director, the circumstances and relationships of his immediate family members 
are to be taken into consideration by the board. This feature runs through almost all the 
criteria contained in the definition. In the commentary to the first criterion, it is stated that 
‘immediate family member’ includes a person’s spouse, parents, children, siblings, 
mothers and fathers-in-law, sons and daughters-in-law, brothers, and sisters-in-law, and 
anyone who shares such person’s home, other than domestic employees.80 This definition 
of immediate family member is indeed quite encompassing and should be adopted by 
other codes when defining ‘family ties’. Other definitions do not place as much emphasis 
on immediate family members and their relationships. 
 
The French and NYSE definitions are similar with respect to only one criterion; that an 
independent director must not be an employee of the company. The French definition 
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adds that he must also not be a corporate officer of the company or an employee or 
director of its parent or a company that it consolidates, and must not have been such in 
the previous five years. The NYSE definition on the other hand adds that such director’s 
immediate family member must also not be an executive officer of the company, and 
must not have been such in the previous three years. In the commentary on this criterion, 
the NYSE definition states that references to the company also include its parent or a 
subsidiary of the same group. It states further that employment as an interim chairman or 
CEO shall not disqualify a director from being considered independent following that 
employment. 
 
First of all, it is difficult to understand the seeming distinction between an employee, on 
one hand, and a corporate officer, on the other hand. Indeed one might ask if it is possible 
to be a corporate or executive officer without first being an employee. Granted, not all 
employees are corporate or executive officers of the company; but is it possible to hold 
the position of corporate or executive officer as a non-employee? Holding such position 
would connote that one is an employee of the company, for even executive directors are 
generally regarded as employees of the company. Therefore the use of both terms in the 
French definition is repetitive and may lead to confusion. All other codes under 
consideration seem to appreciate this view by avoiding such a repetitive use of the 
terms.81  
 
Secondly, it is difficult to understand why a director previously employed as an interim 
chairman or CEO would still be considered to be independent. This is particularly in the 
US where it is common practice to find both positions being occupied by the same 
individual. It is unarguable that the CEO is the ‘chief executive director’ of the company, 
and that executive directors are employed in terms of a contract with the company as 
employer, hence their being referred to as inside directors. Many board chairmen are 
involved in executive and day to day management of the company and would not satisfy 
even the least standards of independence in this regard. Some may argue that the 
rationale for considering such directors as independent lies in the temporariness of the 
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position (as interim chairman or CEO). The fact still remains however, that such director 
would have been so involved in executive management of the company that it would be 
almost impossible for him to act independently in the future. In such situation, the least 
that could be done would be to apply the three-year look-back requirement, barring all 
other considerations, to ensure the absence of any potential conflict of interests.  
 
In another criterion, the French definition provides that an independent director must not 
be ‘ a corporate officer of a company in which the corporation holds a directorship, 
directly or indirectly, or in which an employee appointed as such or a corporate officer of 
the corporation  (currently in office or having held such office going back five years) is a 
director’. The rationale for this provision it would seem, lies in the fact that it would be 
impossible for such director to apply his independent judgment when taking decisions 
that affect the other company, because of his links with the company. As corporate 
officer of that other company, he would definitely be an insider and therefore be privy to 
inside information regarding the company. Such a situation would certainly result in a 
conflict between his interest as a director on one hand, and as corporate officer of the 
other company, on the other hand. The second limb of this criterion seems to be referring 
to cross-directorships. Holding of cross-directorships could be detrimental to an 
independent director’s objective judgment.82 It could lead to relationships or interests 
which could end up compromising the independence of such director. This is why it is 
considered very relevant in determining a director’s independence.83  
 
The French definition further provides that an independent director must not be (or be 
bound directly or indirectly to) a customer, supplier, investment banker or commercial 
banker that is material for the corporation or its group; or for a significant part of whose 
business the corporation or its group accounts. King II and the Australian definition both 
contain similar provisions. The difference here is the addition of the investment or 
commercial banker element. The assumption is that these elements were included as an 
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additional safeguard for protecting and promoting independence. In doing this however, 
care must be taken to ensure that the requirements do not become too stringent or 
cumbersome so as to make it practically impossible for directors to meet the 
requirements. The important factor to be considered is the materiality of the relationship 
or interest under consideration; whether it is potentially detrimental to, or capable of 
compromising the director’s independent judgment.  
 
The first criterion of the NYSE definition disqualifies a director from being considered 
independent unless he has no material relationship, directly or indirectly, with the 
company. Such relationship could be as a partner, shareholder or officer of an 
organisation that has a relationship with the company. Again the issue of materiality of 
the relationship to the company surfaces. Indeed, in the commentary to this criterion, it 
states: 
 
               It is not possible to anticipate, or explicitly to provide for, all circumstances that might signal 
potential conflicts of interest, or that might bear on the materiality of a director’s relationship to a 
listed company…Accordingly, it is best that boards making “independence” determinations 
broadly consider all relevant facts and circumstances. In particular, when assessing the 
materiality of a director’s relationship with the company, the board should consider the issue not 
merely from the standpoint of the director, but also from that of persons or organisations with 
which the director has an affiliation. Material relationships can include commercial, industrial, 
banking, consulting, legal, accounting, charitable and familial relationships among others.84 
 
 
In addition, materiality should be considered in relation to the independence of the 
director. In other words, the question should not only be whether the relationship is one 
that is material, but also whether such material relationship is one that might signal 
potential conflicts of interest. For indeed, not all material relationships that are capable of 
compromising director independence. The approach should therefore be two-fold; is the 
director’s relationship one that is material to the company? Secondly, is it one that is 
potentially detrimental to the director’s sense of independent judgment? Like the 
commentary stated, it is not possible to anticipate all circumstances that might result in 
conflict of interest. This is probably why certain codes like the French and Combined 
codes give the board the latitude to determine that a director is independent, or vice versa 
despite the existence of relationships or circumstances which appear relevant to such 
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determination. In this regard, a board is expected to adopt its own independence 
standards and must explain when a particular director is declared to be independent 
despite having not met the prescribed standards of the company.  
 
The NYSE definition further provides that a director is not independent if he, or his 
immediate family member receives more than $100,000 per year in direct compensation 
from the company other than his director’s fees and pension. The focus here, as stated 
earlier, seems to be on the amount of direct compensation the director or his family 
member receives from the company. Going by this criterion, it means that a director 
could be considered to be independent where he receives more than $100,000 per year as 
long as it is indirect compensation. Likewise, he could be considered to be independent 
even where he receives $99,999 per year in direct compensation. Therefore, so long as 
the amount is not more than $100,000 per year, and the compensation is not direct, such 
director could be considered to be independent of the company. This certainly seems 
absurd. 
 
Another criterion of the definition provides that a director is not independent if he or his 
immediate family member is affiliated with or employed by, a present or former internal 
or external auditor of the company. The French definition has a similar provision. It 
provides that an independent director must not have been an auditor of the corporation 
within the previous five years. The difference is between the two definitions is in the 
inclusion of the terms ‘affiliated with’ and consideration of the director’s immediate 
family member, in the NYSE definition. Indeed, generally speaking, the inclusion of such 
a standard seems quite logical, as it would be difficult, if not impossible, for a director 
who sits on the audit committee for instance, to act in an independent manner where he 
had himself been an auditor of the company. The same applies to where he or his 
immediate family member is affiliated with, or employed by a present or former auditor 
of the company. 
 
The difficulty here is however in determining what kind of relationship would constitute 
an affiliation. Also, considering the fact that there are varying degrees of affiliation, and 
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it may be difficult to anticipate all the relationships or circumstances that could amount to 
such. However, with the goal being to eliminate, or minimise as much as possible, all 
potential causes of a conflict of interest between the director and the company, the board 
must consider the circumstances of the director thoroughly to determine whether he could 
be described as ‘affiliated’ , for it has been stated that where affiliation exists, 
independence disappears.  
 
In another criterion the NYSE definition provides that a director ‘who is employed, or 
whose immediate family member is employed, as an executive officer of another 
company where any of the listed company’s present executives serve on that company’s 
compensation committee is not independent’. This element of the definition is quite 
interesting because of the reference to the ‘compensation committee’. The question that 
comes to mind is why the specific reference to ‘compensation committee’ and not 
‘nomination committee’ or ‘audit committee?’ Indeed, it is arguable that these three are 
the most significant committees of the board to which the role of the independent director 
is very critical.85 Even though the audit committee is sometimes considered more 
important and therefore given more prominence by many commentators (probably 
because of the many accounting and auditing scandals), there’s no doubt that the three 
committees are key, not only to the effective functioning of the board, but also have 
become critical mechanisms for ensuring compliance with independence and other 
corporate governance standards.86  
 
An affiliation with any of these three key committees could certainly impair a director’s 
sense of independence. Whether it is the compensation, audit or nomination committee, a 
director, in the circumstances described in the definition, should not qualify as an 
independent director. Granted that the responsibility of the compensation committee is to 
make recommendations to the board with respect to the compensation and other benefits 
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of the CEO and other executives of the company, the specific reference to this committee 
(and exclusion of the other committees) in the definition seems unclear. As mentioned 
earlier, the NYSE’s attitude to independence is significantly compensatory. It associates 
the standard of independence with the amount of compensation or pecuniary benefits that 
a director receives. The more compensation a director receives, the more unlikely he is to 
be independent. This may be the reason behind the specific reference to the compensation 
committee. This should however not be interpreted as portraying it as the pre-eminent 
committee of the board. 
 
The last limb of the NYSE definition provides that ‘a director who is an executive officer 
or an employee, or whose immediate family member is an executive officer, of a 
company that makes payments to, or receives payments from, the listed company for 
property or services in an amount which, in any single fiscal year, exceeds the greater of 
$1 million, or 2% of such other company’s consolidated gross revenues, is not 
independent ….’. This again reflects the attitude of the NYSE definition of measuring 
independence by the amount of monetary benefits paid to, or received by a director or 
company. One wonders why charitable organisations are not considered as ‘companies’ 
for the purposes of this criterion. As the first limb of the definition recognises, 
relationships with charitable organisations are to be considered when determining 
circumstances that could lead to conflicts of interest, for indeed such relationships could 
be material. The commentary on this criterion states however that ‘a listed company shall 
disclose in its annual proxy statement,…any charitable contributions made by the listed 
company to any charitable organization in which a director serves as an executive 
officer…’.87  
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PART 2 
 
CHAPTER THREE 
 
INDEPENDENT DIRECTOR AND FIRM PERFORMANCE 
 
The clamour for increased independence on corporate boards by independence 
proponents may have largely triumphed. As earlier stated, most commentators applaud 
the trend toward greater board independence.88 Today, commentators speak of the ‘norm’ 
of a supermajority independent board while corporate governance activists clamour for 
boards on which independent directors make up a ‘substantial majority’.89 In proclaiming 
the need for an ‘independent watchdog’, scholars argue that ‘an active and independent 
board of directors working for shareholders clearly would seem to benefit the corporation 
by reducing the losses from misdirected ‘agency’ inherent in the separation of ownership 
from control that is fundamental to the modern corporation’.90 Today many large 
American public companies have “supermajority” independent boards, with only one or 
two inside directors. For example, a 1997 survey of 484 of the S & P 500 firms found that 
over half (56%) of the surveyed firms had only one or two inside directors.91 ‘Only nine 
firms (2%) had a majority of inside directors and the median firm had over 80% outside 
directors.’92 As of 2001, approximately 75% of NYSE-listed companies had independent 
board majorities and 65% of directors of S & P 1500 companies were independent. ‘By 
the time of the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002, most public corporations 
had a supermajority independent board, with only one or two inside directors’.93 
 
                                                 
88
. Sanjat Bhagat and Bernard.Black, ‘The Uncertain Relationship Between Board Composition and Firm 
Performance’ (1999) 54 Business Lawyer, P.2. 
89
. Usha Rodrigues, ‘The Fetishization of Independence’ (2007) University of Georgia School of Law, 07 
Research Paper Series, P.15. Available at www.ssrn.com/abstract.  
90
. Usha Rodrigues op cit Pg. 14. 
91
. Defined broadly as all current and former company officers, even though some researchers consider 
former officers to be outside directors if several years have passed since they last served as officers – 
Bhagat & Black op cit note 86. 
92
. Bhagat and Black, ibid.  
93
. Usha Rodrigues op cit note 88 P.14. 
  
33 
Despite this recent trend towards increased representation by independent directors, some 
proponents of independent directors acknowledge that inside directors serve an 
important, if not vital function on a company’s board.94 The argument is that, because of 
their direct involvement with day-to-day corporate activities, inside directors are better 
positioned to make decisions at the board level that will affect both the short-term and the 
long-term direction of the company.95 Indeed, there is some evidence that having a 
moderate number of inside directors (say three to five on a typical eleven-member board) 
correlates with greater profitability.96 On the other hand, studies of overall firm 
performance have found no convincing evidence that firms with majority-independent 
boards perform better than firms without such boards.97 One could argue that the 
inclusion of the outside independent directors may actually hamper the efficient operation 
of a board of directors.98 ‘Because of their limited involvement with corporate activities, 
outside independent directors do not have exposure to the day-to-day activities of the 
firm, and thus could prove to be an impediment to management in their attempts to 
manage and monitor the operations of the firm’.99  
 
According to some commentators, independent directors ‘often turn out to be lapdogs 
rather than watchdogs’. Reference is made to companies like Enron, Hewlett-Packard, 
GM, IBM, Kodak, Chrysler, Sears, and Westinghouse etc, which performed abysmally 
for years despite their majority independent boards. Others like WorldCom, Apple, 
Converse, United Health, to name only a few, have been tainted by scandal. Also, ‘chief 
executive compensation exploded over the same period during which independent 
directors became dominant on large firm boards - a trend that has continued despite the 
recent trend toward supermajority-independent boards and independent compensation 
committees’.100 These and related events have therefore brought into question the role of 
the independent director in relation to monitoring management, rendering independent 
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judgement on managerial performance and ultimately in relation to the performance of 
the firm. The question has therefore been frequently asked, does increased board 
independence translate to improved corporate performance? 
 
This chapter reviews evidence discovered from various empirical studies undertaken by 
selected scholars and commentators. These will show that the overall evidence on the 
impact of independent director on firm performance is inconclusive, and sometimes 
conflicting. While some studies produce evidence that independent directors do not 
enhance corporate performance, on the one hand, on the other hand other studies produce 
some evidence that independent directors add value in certain areas like the performance 
of specific board tasks. (This evidence tends to point out that majority independent 
boards perform some specific functions better, but other functions worse).101 The first 
part of this chapter therefore reviews evidence produced from studies on the impact, if 
any, of independent directors (or majority-independent boards) in the performance of 
specific board tasks, like making or defending a takeover bid, CEO replacement, 
executive remuneration, and financial reporting. It also briefly examines evidence 
produced from studies on the possible benefits on firm performance, of certain 
mechanisms like separation of the positions of CEO and Chairperson of the board, and 
the use of audit, compensation and nomination committees composed entirely of 
independent directors. In the second part of this chapter, we examine direct evidence on 
the correlation between independent directors (board composition) and overall firm 
performance.  
 
DO INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS ADD VALUE? 
 
TAKEOVERS 
One important role of the board of directors of a company is approving (or not) major 
investment decisions like the acquisition or takeover of another company.102 If 
independent directors genuinely represent the interests of shareholders, and if they strive 
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to maximise shareholder wealth, then their influence should be reflected in the takeover 
process.103 (The stock price reaction to the announcement of a takeover bid provides a 
measure of whether shareholders think the acquirer has gotten a bargain or has 
overpaid)104Indeed, some empirical evidence does suggest that independent directors do 
play an important role of shareholder advocate.105A research study by Byrd and Hickman 
reports that shareholders benefit more when independent directors constitute the majority 
of the board in tender offers for bidders.106They found that, ‘for a sample of 128 takeover 
bids over the period 1980 to 1987, takeover bidders with a majority of independent 
directors earned, on average, an announcement-date abnormal return of 0% on their 
acquisitions while bidders with a majority of executive and affiliated non-executive 
directors lost, on average, a statistically significant amount’.107This appears to be because 
bidders with majority-independent boards offer lower takeover premia.108It also appears 
to show that independent directors, while permitting their companies to pay too much 
when acquiring another company, were not prepared to over-pay as much as non-
independent directors.109 
 
With regard to responses to a takeover offer, some studies have shown that tender offer 
target companies with majority-independent boards realize higher stock price returns than 
target companies without majority-independent boards.110This appears to show that target 
companies with majority-independent boards are better at extracting higher takeover 
premia from an acquirer, thereby providing increased economic benefits to shareholders. 
However, Bhagat and Black argue that there cannot be greater efficiency gains if the 
target company has a majority-independent board of directors. They argue that a higher 
takeover price is simply a transfer of wealth from the bidder’s shareholders to the target’s 
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shareholders,111and that there is no evidence of higher returns to both bidder and target 
companies, if the target company has a majority-independent board. They conclude that 
higher returns to shareholders of actual target companies may not benefit shareholders of 
potential target companies, because there’s some evidence that this could lead to fewer 
takeover bids for companies with majority-independent boards.112 
 
The perception that independent directors are better at maximising shareholder wealth 
may be misplaced after all especially with regard to the adoption of takeover defences. 
Some studies report that the stock market reaction to the adoption of poison pill defences 
was significantly positive when the firm had a majority-independent board, and 
significantly negative when it did not.113On the other hand, some other studies find a 
negative stock market reaction to adoption of poison pills and other takeover defences 
when there’s a higher proportion of independent directors. Still others have found no 
significant correlation between the proportion of independent directors and the likelihood 
that the company will adopt a poison pill defence.114 Also with regard to the adoption of 
greenmail as a takeover defence, companies with a high proportion of outside directors 
are more likely to pay greenmail to a potential bidder to persuade the bidder to go 
away.115Overall there isn’t much evidence that independent boards behave in a 
significantly more (or less) shareholder-friendlier fashion than other boards when they 
adopt and employ takeover defences.116 
 
CEO REPLACEMENT 
There is widespread acceptance that a central role of the board is disciplining or replacing 
an under-performing CEO. There is little evidence pointing to a difference in attitude of 
independent directors and inside directors towards the replacement of a CEO. In an in-
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depth study on how board composition correlates with CEO replacement, Weisbach117 
found that a board composed of at least 60% independent directors was more likely than 
a board comprising less than 60% independent directors to fire an under-performing 
company’s CEO.118Other studies show that firms with a high proportion of outside 
directors replace CEOs at a higher rate than other firms.119There is also some evidence 
that firm performance improves modestly, on average, after a CEO is 
replaced.120However, other commentators argue that the economic significance of the 
additional firings by 60% independent boards is small. They argue that the evidence 
reflects that independent directors who are likely to know less about a firm than inside 
directors may be quicker to replace a CEO if the firm’s performance is poor, but may be 
too slow to replace a bad CEO as long as the firm’s stock price performance remains 
respectable.121 
 
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 
It is widely accepted that another critical role of the board of directors is determining and 
evaluating the remuneration of the CEO and other senior executive officers of the 
company. To strengthen the board in performing this task, it is popularly recommended 
that the compensation (or remuneration) committee of the board be composed mainly, if 
not entirely, of independent directors. The compensation committee can implement 
compensation arrangements that will help in achieving the company’s long-term 
performance objectives and ensure that shareholder interests are not subordinated to 
management’s short-term interests.122However some studies have reported that executive 
compensation is higher on average in firms with majority-independent boards.123Other 
studies reveal no evidence of a correlation between the proportion of independent 
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directors on the compensation committee and CEO remuneration.124Conversely, several 
other studies have found that CEO remuneration is on average higher the greater the 
proportion of independent directors on the board. In other words, the higher the 
proportion of independent directors on the board, the more the CEO is paid.125 
 
In a study of 161 of the 250 largest U.S. listed companies, it was reported that CEO 
compensation was greater in companies that had compensation committees that included 
affiliated non-executive directors (insider-influenced compensation committees) than in 
companies that had compensation committees comprised solely of independent directors 
(independent compensation committees).126The study found that ‘on average, the CEO of 
a company with an insider-influenced remuneration committee received approximately 
20% more remuneration than a CEO of a company with an independent remuneration 
committee, everything else equal’.127A study by Fich and Shivdasani found that ‘the 
probability of a firm adopting a stock-option plan for outside directors is higher when the 
board is dominated by independent outside directors and when institutional equity 
ownership is high’.128In a different study involving 167 U.S firms, it was reported that the 
greater the CEO influence over the board of directors, the higher the levels of CEO salary 
and bonuses.129Also, a study of the banking industry reported that the proportion of 
outside directors correlated negatively with salary expenditures, suggesting that outside 
directors helped to control excessive salary expenditure.130 
 
In their study of the value of the independent director in Australia, Lawrence and 
Stapledon reported that the remuneration practices of Australian companies do not appear 
to vary in accordance with the composition of the remuneration committee. Similarly, 
they found no evidence that combining the roles of CEO and chairperson, or having less 
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independent directors on the board, leads to higher CEO pay.131 These studies, on the 
whole, indicate that the evidence on the relationship between independent directors (or 
board composition) and executive compensation is inconclusive. Similarly, even though 
the evidence has failed to clearly erase doubts as to the ability of independent directors to 
curb excessive executive compensation, there is no doubt that an independent 
compensation committee can strengthen corporate boards by effectively controlling and 
evaluating the level of executive compensation. Reference is sometimes made to the 
compensation committees of companies like Enron, Global Crossing Ltd. etc which were 
comprised entirely of independent directors who were unable to monitor and control 
excessive executive compensation.132 
 
FINANCIAL FRAUD AND FINANCIAL REPORTING 
With the passage of the Sarbanes Oxley Act in the U.S., all listed companies are required 
to establish audit committees comprised entirely of independent outside directors. The 
audit committee plays a critical role in maintaining the reliability of the company’s 
financial statements. Indeed, it is widely believed that an independent audit committee 
has the potential to strengthen the board of directors through controlling management’s 
reporting of financial results.133Empirical evidence on the relationship between an 
independent audit committee and the reliability of financial statements is conflicting. 
While some studies have found that companies with reliable financial information are 
more likely to have independent audit committees, others indicate that the presence of an 
independent audit committee does not increase the reliability of financial 
information.134One study found that companies with a majority of inside (executive) 
directors and without an audit committee were more likely to commit financial fraud.135A 
similar study found that firms that commit fraud have fewer independent directors than 
matched control firms that did not commit fraud.136Conversely, a different study found no 
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evidence that board composition affects the overall quality of financial reporting by U.S. 
companies.137 
 
INDEPENDENT DIRECTOR AND FIRM PERFORMANCE 
 
We now examine existing empirical evidence (mostly US based) on the relationship 
between independent directors (or board composition) and corporate performance. The 
results again are mixed and inconclusive. ‘The controversy revolves around whether or 
not board composition has any impact on the performance of the firm.’138 While some 
studies report that having more independent directors on the board improves corporate 
performance, other studies have not found any correlation between independent directors 
and corporate performance.139Those studies that indicate some link between independent 
directors and firm performance include a study by Baysinger and Butler which reports 
that the proportion of independent directors in 1970 was positively correlated with return 
on equity in 1980.140’Firms with a higher percentage of independent directors in the early 
part of the decade ended up with superior performance records, on average, later in the 
period’.141Also a study of 100 small listed U.S. companies found that ‘financial 
performance was better in companies having a relatively large number of independent 
directors than in those having a relatively small number of independent directors’.142 
Other studies like Gautchi and Jones (1987), Cochrane et al. (1985), Zahra and Stanton 
(1988), Rosenstein and whyatt (1990), and Donaldson and Davis (1991) found that board 
composition had a strong influence on the accountability of managers to shareholders and 
the performance of the firm.143 
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Among those studies that found a negative correlation between a high proportion of 
independent directors and future firm performance is the study by April Klein, which 
assessed the composition of the boards’ committee structures of firms listed on the S & P 
500. She found that the proportion of independent directors had no consistent effect on 
firm performance.144She also found that ‘inside directors are more likely to be found on 
the boards of firms that need the inside director’s expertise, which suggests that these 
directors can be valuable if properly used’.145In another study by Agrawal and Knoeber, 
it was found that a greater proportion of independent directors reduce the firms 
performance.146In other words, greater board independence is negatively related company 
performance. In one of the most comprehensive and large-scale studies ever done in this 
area, Bhagat and Black found no evidence that firms with a majority-independent board 
perform better than firms with more inside than independent directors.147Instead, a high 
proportion of independent directors was found to correlate with slower growth. They also 
found that it may be valuable for firms to have a significant number of inside directors. 
They studied the financial and stock price performance, between 1985 and 1995, of 957 
large U.S. public corporations. They also studied share ownership by management, the 
board of directors, and 5% shareholders of these companies, and they found that 
independent directors with significant stock positions may add value, whereas others do 
not.148 
 
In a study of the independent director in Chinese corporate governance, Donald Clarke 
reports that there is no strong empirical evidence to support the view that independent 
directors in China enhance corporate performance.149In another study of the top 100 
listed companies on the Australian Stock Exchange, it was found that there was no 
conclusive evidence that the proportion of independent directors influences corporate 
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performance, whether measured as share price returns or accounting performance.150 The 
studies failed to produce solid evidence supporting the proposition that independent 
directors add or destroy value.151A similar study, of the relationship between board 
demographics and corporate performance in 348 of Australia’s largest publicly listed 
companies, reported a positive relationship between the proportion of inside directors and 
the market-based measure of firm performance.152 On the other hand however, no such 
relationship was found with respect to the accounting-based performance measure.153 
 
In a different study, Millstein and McAvoy adopted a different approach by focusing on 
board behaviour rather than board composition. They found a substantial and statistically 
significant correlation between the presence of an active board of directors and superior 
corporate performance (measured by operating profit excess of costs of capital over the 
industry average).154 In their words: 
 
               Our experience is that boardroom behaviour is what is critical, and that the professional board is 
an active monitoring (but not meddling) organisation that participates with management in 
formulating corporate strategy in the interests of the shareholders, develops appropriate 
incentives for management and other employees to harness their interests to achieve the 
agreed-upon strategic plan, and then judges the performance of management against the 
strategic plan. Given this position, one cannot identify through generic structural characteristics – 
such as the number of outside directors, the number of board meetings, and the like – whether a 
board is performing. The only certain way to know whether a board is performing is to be present 
in the boardroom, and we cannot be present. But certain elements of board process indicate that 
there is an environment in which active monitoring is present. And to identify well-governing 
boards, we believe certain process representatives can be used to indicate monitoring 
performance. 
 
The process representatives referred to by Millstein and McAvoy were; independent 
board leadership – whether through a non-executive chairperson or a lead independent 
director; periodic meetings of the boards independent directors without the presence of 
management; and formal guidelines to regulate the relationship between the board and 
management.155 Millstein and McAvoy considered that these representatives indicated 
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board behaviour from which it could be inferred that a board is independent, is likely to 
have adopted a professional culture, and is therefore a well-governed board.  
 
From these various studies reviewed here, it can be observed that there is no apparent 
consensus among scholars and researchers about the relationship between board 
composition and firm performance. There is no conclusive evidence that the appointment 
of independent directors has an impact on firm performance. There is also inconclusive 
evidence that a greater proportion of independent directors results in improved levels of 
performance. Similarly the evidence that a preponderance of inside directors on the board 
results in better firm performance is also inconclusive. However, in sum, there’s no doubt 
that a greater number of corporate governance advocates seem to favour an increased role 
for the outside independent director in control and management of the firm. This is 
consistent with the agency cost rationale that independent directors, by monitoring and 
overseeing the management of the company’s business, serve to reduce the cost 
occasioned by the divergence between the interests of corporate managers and that of 
shareholders.                                                                                                                                                                               
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
TOWARDS MORE EFFECTIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
 
The heightened global attention to corporate governance in recent years is evidence to the 
fact that all is not well with leadership of our corporations. One lesson that Enron, 
Parmalat, Worldcom  and others taught the corporate world was that no company can be 
too big (financially or otherwise) to fail. A common thread that ran through these 
monumental corporate failures was their poor corporate governance culture, to wit, poor 
management, fraud, insider abuse by the board members and management, poor asset and 
liability management, poor regulation and supervision.156These events, along with other 
instances of failed corporate governance, have been identified as the principal causes of 
the loss of confidence by the investing public in the stock markets, and the general lack 
of trust that has plagued the business community.157Indeed, shareholders, employees, 
creditors and the general public place broad trust and authority in the corporate directors 
to ensure the success of our business institutions.158’Unfortunately, it took the recent 
wave of corporate corruption and abuses to focus our attention on the board of directors 
and on corporate governance more broadly’.159These corporate abuses have severely 
affected investor and public confidence and trust in the integrity of business institutions 
and leadership. 
 
Most surveys on global trust levels show that public trust in business institutions and 
leadership is at a low level.160Corporate governors have continually failed to live up to 
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our expectations, and ineffectual boards have continued to cast doubt on the entire 
corporate governance system.161Despite the proliferation of various codes, guidelines and 
other instruments of corporate governance best practices, and the continuous call for 
increased director independence, most studies have shown little or no correlation between 
the presence of independent directors (or board composition) and firm performance. 
Some studies have actually reported a negative correlation between the two elements. In 
the light of the growing scepticism as to the relevance and impact of the independent 
director, the tough question that must be answered therefore is, how do we ensure that 
independent (outside) directors are empowered to effectively perform their role of 
independent and active monitors of management, for the benefit of the shareholders? Put 
differently, ‘how do we ensure that directors are accountable and act in the best interest 
of the corporation and its shareholders especially given that shareholders’ legal and 
practical influence over the corporation is limited?’.162 
 
Clearly, the challenge is therefore how to make independent directors more effective and 
responsive to their responsibilities. The conflicting evidence from the studies outlined 
above and the corporate abuses in Enron and other companies around the world teach us 
one thing; that independence is not enough. It is interesting to note that Enron 
Corporation had its board of directors composed of a majority of outside independent 
directors.163Of the 14 directors, only two were insiders. They reflected a wide range of 
business, finance, accounting and governmental experience. ‘The board had all the 
committees one would hope to see, including an executive committee, finance committee, 
audit and compliance committee, and nominating and corporate governance committee. 
Perhaps most important to the board’s monitoring role, the Enron audit committee had a 
model charter and was chaired by a former accounting professor who had served as the 
dean of the Stanford Graduate School of Business. Finally, the board regularly met five 
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times a year, with special meetings called as needed’.164Clearly, the existence of such a 
‘great’ board did nothing to prevent the auditing and accounting frauds that led to the 
failure of the firm. It looks like the board was only ‘going through the motions and 
checking the boxes’.165 
 
One fundamental concern that has been raised as a result of these turn of events relates to 
the utility of the independent director. It is often argued that independent directors lack 
the time, information, and motivation to manage the company effectively.166They are 
usually ignorant of what is happening inside the company.167Independent directors are by 
definition individuals from outside the corporation, who generally have demanding day 
jobs and other commitments that keep them from devoting much time to board 
affairs.168For example, directors often sit on multiple boards or are executives of other 
companies.169Some may be university professors, public office holders or individuals 
involved in private professional practice. For this reason, they rely on insiders and other 
employees who are more knowledgeable about the company’s operations, for information 
and guidance in performing their duties.170This is in addition to the fact that these 
directors who must monitor management are, in most companies, appointed by the very 
managers they must monitor. This situation certainly leads to a loss of objectivity on the 
part of the director. It is also an incentive for passivity and acquiescence to 
management’s initiatives and little incentive to actively monitor management where 
directors owe their positions to executive largesse.171’At its worst, such a board of 
directors becomes nothing but an executive’s rubber stamp’.172 
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Another concern that has been raised with regard to the effectiveness of independent 
directors is that most of them are not given adequate incentives. Directors cannot actively 
monitor management when there are no tangible incentives to do so. The argument is that 
there is need for incentives like equity based compensation, in order to align the interests 
of directors with the interests of the shareholders. The idea is that ownership and control 
of the company would be united through meaningful director equity ownership, and 
hence better management monitoring.173Some have argued that equity ownership by 
directors does create more active monitoring.174There is some evidence that greater share 
ownership may improve independent director performance. Bhagat and Black in their 
study of board composition and firm performance, find some evidence of a correlation 
between outside director ownership and firm performance.175They conclude that their 
evidence shows that independent directors may perform better if they have stronger 
stock-based incentives to do so.176 
 
Indeed, there seems to be some credibility to the argument that option-based 
compensation helps align director’s interests with those of the shareholders. Directors 
have been variously described as the shareholders’ advocate. Independent directors 
particularly can become key elements in helping to reduce managerial agency costs, and 
this can be achieved through increased stock-option based compensation for independent 
directors. Stock-options might seem to be appropriate because it not only directly aligns 
directors’ interests to those of the shareholders, but it also indirectly aligns directors’ 
share returns in accordance with the performance of the firm. Independent directors 
should not only be completely independent of management but must also be adequately 
motivated and incentivized to vigorously champion the cause of the shareholders and to 
provide objective oversight of management. ‘While independence promotes objectivity, 
the board also must have an incentive to exercise that objectivity effectively. Granting 
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independent directors equity ownership in the firm may help achieve this goal’.177When 
directors have no stake in the enterprise other than their board seats, there is simply no 
personal pecuniary incentive to engage in the active monitoring of management.178 
 
Another concern that has been raised regarding the effectiveness of independent directors 
is whether the independent director is ‘truly’ independent. Some argue that the 
independent director as created by corporate governance advocates is not independent 
enough. There are concerns about ‘soft’ conflicts of interest and ‘structural biases’ that 
still exist and that might compromise director independence.179According to one 
commentator ‘some directors who are classified as independent are beholden to the 
company or its current CEO in too subtle a way to be captured in customary definitions 
of independence’.180The case of Enron is quite instructive in this regard. There existed 
indirect relationships between its management and board as a result of charitable 
donations and political contributions. These relationships obviously compromised the 
independence and objectivity of the directors.181For instance, Enron and its CEO and 
Chairman, made donations totalling nearly $600,000 to an organization where two of 
Enron’s directors had served as president. Also, an organization which employed an 
Enron director received more than $50,000 in donations from Enron.182’In 2000 Enron 
paid one of its outside directors over $490,000 for his consulting work; and the National 
Tank Company, on whose board an Enron director sat, recorded over $2.5million in 
revenue from sales of equipment and services to Enron subsidiaries’.183Could the Enron 
outside directors be said to have been ‘truly’ independent? 
 
Another concern that has been raised in recent times has to do with the personal liabilities 
of directors. Today, there are overwhelmingly high expectations for directors, especially 
independent directors, to perform their oversight role effectively. The call for greater 
independence from outside directors has resulted in a demand for increased 
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responsibility, accountability and liabilities on the part of directors. Thanks to widespread 
pressure the legal and regulatory framework within which directors must function have 
been made more stringent. A director can be held personally liable for any damages 
resulting from breach of their duties to the company. The American corporate system for 
example, ‘permits shareholders to sue directors and officers for injuries that they have 
sustained either directly by corporate action or derivatively, on behalf of the corporation, 
for injuries done to the corporation because of wrongful actions by its officers or 
directors’.184Increasingly directors are being called upon to be accountable. The legal 
environment in which they operate is becoming more and more risky and this may have 
led to a tight non-executive director labour market.185 
 
Due to the heavy work-load demands on their time and the related risk to their 
reputations, many who are qualified are becoming increasingly reluctant to take on 
available directorships. Consequently, the market for outside independent directors 
becomes smaller as it becomes more difficult to identify individuals who will be willing 
to accept the personal liability risks involved with board membership. According to one 
writer, directors and officers feel that they are ‘under a microscope, and that serious 
consequences will follow if they make a mistake’.186The increasing complexity and risk 
attached to board responsibilities have other consequences for corporate performance and 
strategy. For instance, companies might introduce narrower rather than broader 
specifications of the skills and experiences required for outside director 
appointments.187On the other hand, directors may become less scrupulous in their 
monitoring and evaluating of management decisions and activities, for fear of falling foul 
of the liability requirements. In addition management may become risk-averse and refrain 
from taking prudent business risk, a trend which will certainly be inimical to business 
growth as no company ever succeeded without taking some risks.188’Directors and 
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managers should not have to fear legal liability every time they are wrong, assuming that 
they acted in good faith’.189 
 
IS INDEPENDENCE OVERRATED? 
 
Commentators have approached the question of what ‘true’ independence really is from 
different perspectives. While some define independence by those formal characteristics 
and criteria that may qualify a director to be considered as independent (structural 
approach), others approach independence from the point of view of the way and manner 
in which a particular director carries out his role as director (behavioural approach). 
Whatever approach one takes, most independence advocates are agreed as to the fact that 
‘mere’ independence is not enough. In order to achieve maximum board effectiveness, 
and to strengthen director independence, attention must not only be placed on those 
formal attributes required of directors, but also emphasis should be on other non-formal 
factors that may be relevant in this regard. In order to build trust in the ability of 
independent directors, and indeed the board as a whole, there’s a need to move beyond 
the current ‘box-ticking’ approach to director independence. As stated earlier in this 
study, there’s the need to move beyond the formal or ‘hard’ approach taken by many 
recent reform initiatives, to a more extensive but ‘soft’ approach.190If the lessons learnt 
from Enron and other corporate failures are anything to go by, then the concept of 
director independence must be approached from a different perspective, especially when 
the goal is to improve board effectiveness. 
 
Van Den Berghe and Baelden proposed the concept of ‘independence of mind’. 
According to them, the concept captures the idea that independence is about the character 
and the spirit of the person under consideration, rather than being a structural formal 
concept.191It is about the ability and willingness to make an independent judgement 
which is not guaranteed by the definitions of the corporate governance codes and 
recommendations. According to them, ‘an independent director should not only find 
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himself formally in the right position but needs also “something more” than the 
characteristics determined in the corporate governance codes and 
recommendations’.192They draw a distinction between formal independence and 
independence of mind. He states that formal independence and independence of the mind, 
are not ends in themselves, rather they are a means to achieving an end, the end being 
board effectiveness. They identify vigilant monitoring and objective decision making as 
the keys to board performance, and that these should be the focus of the board.193The 
board, in order to achieve vigilant monitoring and objective decision-making, would need 
both elements of formal independence and independence of the mind.  
 
Richard Leblanc submits that because independence is a state of mind, it is difficult to 
regulate. According to him, much of what comprises independence may only be 
identified within the boardroom, in the context of specific decision-making situations and 
the individuals involved.194He states that ‘a director may be conflicted and yet 
independent and not conflicted and not independent within the boardroom’. He adds that 
there’s the tendency to appoint directors who are distant and uninformed about the 
business of the corporation, and unable to provide concrete and meaningful strategic 
input to management, or to hold management accountable for achieving corporate goals, 
all in a bid to appease regulators in the over-zealous search for ‘independence’.195He 
concludes that for an effective board to be created, the company, or nominating 
committee must focus attention on (i) what competencies are needed on the board, and 
which ones, if any, are missing, (ii) mix of behavioural types of the prospective 
candidates (They must determine if the person they are recommending to the board for 
membership is a behavioural type who will contribute to making board process more 
effective). These are the factors that should drive the selection process of prospective 
directors. 196 
 
                                                 
192
. Van Den Berghe, ibid.  
193
. Van Den Berghe, op cit note 55 P.62. 
194
. Richard Leblanc, ‘what’s Wrong with Corporate Governance: A Note’ (2004) Corporate Governance: 
An International Review, Vol.12, Issue 4, P.439. 
195
. Richard Leblanc op cit note 192 P.440. 
196
. Richard Leblanc ibid. 
  
52 
Another writer argues that ‘effective corporate governance does not depend on the 
independence of some particular subset of directors, but on the independent behaviour of 
the board as a unit’.197He states that there are three primary functions of board 
independence: clear accountability to shareholders, informational transparency and 
increased shareholder voice in corporate decision-making.198According to him, ‘not only 
do these functions more meaningfully capture the monitoring and oversight norms 
envisioned by current independence regimes, they also yield practicable guidelines for 
refining the processes by which a board goes about its business’.199He relies on the 
tripartite board structure proposed by Professor Donald Langevoort, that a board be 
composed of conventional independent monitors, quasi-independent or “grey” mediators, 
and managers.200In their own work, Roberts, McNulty and Stiles argue that ‘while board 
structure, composition and independence condition board effectiveness, it is the actual 
conduct of the non-executive vis-à-vis the executive that determines board 
effectiveness’.201According to them, ‘independence’ should not just be imagined as 
requiring that non-executives remain aloof and suspicious of the executives, but should 
be seen as a valuable resource for executives,202for ‘enacted in the form of suspicion, 
“independence” emphasises the division between executive and non-executive directors. 
Enacted as a resource for the success of the company, “independence” merely strengthens 
the capabilities of the unitary board in dealing with the challenges and risks that are 
always associated with decision-making’.203 
 
The debate on director independence has been on for quite a while, and is bound to 
continue as long as the quest for improved board effectiveness and corporate governance 
exists. Commentators will continue to propose different conceptions of what they think 
constitute ‘real’ independence. What is an accepted fact is that an effective board remains 
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a critical element for the attainment of good corporate governance. Governance reforms 
therefore, must be able to embrace the various conceptions of independence, whether 
from the point of view of formally structured criteria or from the point of view of 
individual director characteristics. In doing this however, the focus should be on how best 
to improve individual independent director effectiveness. Such reforms would require a 
shift beyond the current formal and structural approach to the concept of director 
independence, as contained in most corporate governance guidelines.  
 
IMPROVING INDEPENDENT DIRECTOR EFFECTIVENESS 
 
In this final part of the study, an attempt is made at proposing recommendations on how 
best to improve the effectiveness of independent directors. A preponderance of studies on 
the impact of the independent director on firm performance, as revealed earlier, report 
inconclusive evidence. Even the many formal and informal initiatives taken so far with 
respect to strengthening board effectiveness have not diminished the growing confusion 
as to what role independent directors must play in the corporation, and how they can best 
be equipped to perform this role. There is no doubt that independence plays a critical role 
in effective corporate governance, especially with regard to reducing conflicts of interest, 
and objective monitoring and decision-making. Enron and many others after it, revealed 
that in the area of board effectiveness, more needs to be done. The presence of nominally 
independent directors on the board will not automatically translate to an effective board. 
In other words, an independent board is not equal to an active board. An active or 
effective board is a function of proper motivation and incentivization. 
 
It has been suggested that one way to improve the performance of independent outside 
directors is in the area of incentives. The argument is that if properly incentivized, 
independent directors will be better motivated to perform their role of objective 
monitoring and oversight of management for the benefit of the shareholders. This 
reasoning sounds quite logical, for the independent or outside director is an individual 
who supposedly has no material relationship with the company, apart from his 
directorship, and therefore may have no personal interest or incentive to effectively 
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monitor management. One major criticism of boards of directors has been their failure to 
engage in the kind of active management oversight that results in more effective 
corporate performance.204This has therefore led to calls for the formulation of better 
incentive mechanisms for directors such as compensation, replacement and the 
opportunity to obtain other board directorships. However in recent times, more emphasis 
has been placed on equity-based compensation for directors, in other words, making 
directors to actively take part in the ownership of the company. 
 
The rationale for the current call for equity or stock option-based compensation for 
outside directors, is that such compensation will help to align the interests of the directors 
with those of the shareholders. In other words, ‘the idea is to reunite ownership and 
control through meaningful director stock ownership and hence better management 
monitoring’.205The argument is that substantial equity ownership by the outside directors 
creates a personally-based incentive to actively monitor.206Evidence from Enron and 
others alike, suggest that independent outside directors are too passive and therefore 
negligent of their monitoring role. This, it has been suggested is because of the lack of 
strong incentives for them to get involved and committed to performing their 
role.207Accordingly, it has been stated: “The board of directors is responsible for making 
sure that the company has a sound strategy so that shareholders’ interests will be 
protected. However, for many non-executive directors, the performance of the companies 
they oversee has almost no impact on their personal wealth because they have very little 
stock ownership in these companies…From an agency theory perspective, these non-
executive directors are just like the executives they oversee: they are the ‘agents’ of the 
‘principals’ (the shareholders), not the ‘principals’ themselves. If there is a strong need to 
provide incentives for one group of the agents – the executives, there should also be a 
strong need to provide incentives for another group of the agents – the non-
executives”.208 
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The theory here is that increased equity-based compensation for independent directors 
helps to improve their engagement in good governance and also guarantees their 
independence from management. Indeed there is some empirical evidence that equity-
based compensation for independent directors not only helps to align director interests 
with those of shareholders, but it also correlates with improved corporate performance. In 
one study, Fich and Shivdasani found that there was a positive and significant association 
between the market to book ratio and the presence of a stock option plan for outside 
directors.209 Their result suggests that equity-based compensation for outside directors 
has a positive impact on firm value.210In another study, Bhagat, Carey and Elson found a 
significant correlation between the amount of stock owned by individual outside directors 
and firm performance (based on a variety of performance measures).211Their explanation 
for this finding is that the equity ownership created better management monitoring on the 
part of the board and hence, improved results.212This is in line with their hypothesis that 
there is a common connection between substantial director share ownership and better 
monitoring.213 
 
It may be difficult to agree categorically with these results, that equity-based 
compensation for independent directors does have some positive impact on firm 
performance. The evidence on this, like others earlier mentioned, is inconclusive. 
However, it is difficult to refuse that there is some merit in the notion that such 
compensation helps in aligning the interests of the independent director with the interests 
of the shareholders. To effectively pursue these shareholder interests, outside independent 
directors must have the motivation to remain independent from management so as to be 
effective monitors. Not only will equity ownership align directors to shareholder 
interests, but it will also make them responsive to the performance of the firm. ‘By 
becoming equity holders, the outside directors assume a personal stake in the success or 
failure of the enterprise. When directors are active equity participants, they have an 
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incentive to monitor management’s performance more effectively, since poor monitoring 
may have a direct negative impact upon their personal financial interests’.214Independent 
directors without equity ownership have little or no incentive to actively monitor 
management. It is therefore submitted that apart from objective monitoring, long-term 
equity ownership for independent directors is a key mechanism for achieving effective 
corporate governance. ‘While independence may create the objectivity necessary for 
proper oversight, it is equity ownership, in combination with independence, that creates 
the incentive for objective directors to act ultimately in shareholders’ interest – to create 
the kind of corporate productivity that merits past and future investments by the 
public’.215 
 
Proper and continuous performance evaluation and assessment of the board of directors 
has also been identified as one of the mechanisms for achieving effective corporate 
governance. Many corporate governance codes and guidelines have proposed a 
framework for regularly evaluating the activities of the board of directors to ensure the 
effective performance of their functions.216They recommend that companies must put in 
place controls and systems to make effective and meaningful evaluation of directors 
possible. A major advantage of periodic evaluation process is that it reveals the quality of 
the board and the directors on it. It also helps in identifying how effective the board has 
been in trying to perform its functions. Evaluation should be both collectively as a board, 
and on an individual director basis. The board must have in place some mechanism for 
assessing the performance of each individual director. Individual evaluation provides the 
board with an opportunity to probe particular issues in depth, and this can be achieved 
through either self or peer evaluation.217While self-evaluation will help to encourage 
directors to reflect on their personal contributions to board activities, peer evaluation will 
help directors to identify each other’s individual strengths and weaknesses.218 By having 
members of the board evaluate each other, it is possible to gain a more objective view of 
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the strengths and weaknesses of each director and their contributions to the effectiveness 
of the board.219 
 
Regular evaluation of the board is a process that can ensure that directors develop a clear 
understanding of their role and responsibilities. ‘On appointment, non-executive directors 
will already have relevant skills, knowledge, experience and abilities. Nonetheless, a non-
executive director’s credibility and effectiveness in the boardroom will depend not just on 
their existing capability but on their ability to extend and refresh their knowledge and 
skills’.220The King II corporate governance code of South Africa recommends that the 
board’s informal evaluation should be conducted by the chairperson and, that the board, 
through the nomination committee or similar board committee should regularly review its 
required mix of skills and experience and other qualities such as its demographics and 
diversity in order to assess its effectiveness.221 
 
Analogous to a regular evaluation and appraisal of directors is the need for continuous 
training and education for directors, especially independent outside directors. As earlier 
pointed out, independent directors are usually outsiders who are not involved in the day 
to day management of the company. As a result, they may not possess the kind of 
extensive and in depth knowledge about the firm and entrepreneurial skills that may be 
necessary for them to effectively perform their monitoring role. Unlike the executive 
directors (insiders), they are not familiar with the inner processes of the firm, and this no 
doubt could impede their ability to make the kind of objective and well informed 
decisions expected of them. Indeed, with the recent spotlight on the independent director 
in the quest for more effective corporate governance mechanisms, there is no doubt that 
the responsibilities of the independent director will continue to expand. If independent 
directors are to employ the kind of independent and objective decision-making required 
for effective oversight and monitoring of management, then companies must have in 
place adequate training and other educational mechanisms to equip these directors in 
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performing their role. It is not enough to require objectivity, integrity and other high 
ethical standards from independent directors; indeed without these personal attributes, an 
independent director cannot be ‘truly’ independent, and will not be able to apply an 
objective judgement when required to do so. However, to achieve the level of 
effectiveness required today of boards, directors must be able to build their knowledge of 
business and entrepreneurial skills and other corporate techniques. 
 
Another mechanism that could be a potent tool for improving director effectiveness, are 
the shareholders themselves. Thanks to the widely dispersed ownership structure in many 
large corporations, shareholders were rendered powerless in the running of these 
companies. Even with the rise of institutional investors, especially in the US, there has 
been a sustained call for more direct participation by shareholders in corporate 
governance. Shareholders, in many cases of corporate abuse, end up at the receiving end, 
as their long-term interests are always at risk. An example is Enron where directors and 
other top managers emerged from their bankrupt corporation with substantial financial 
gains while investors and employee shareholders sustained large losses.222One way 
therefore, to protect the legitimate rights and interests of shareholders is to have in place 
mechanisms and structures to enhance shareholder participation, particularly in the 
selection of independent directors.  
 
Independent directors act as a link between the shareholders and management. They are 
supposed to hold managers accountable and to report to shareholders about managerial 
conduct.223Therefore, not only should they be directly involved in nomination and 
election of directors, but also mechanisms should be put in place whereby a particular 
director who fails in his responsibilities can be identified and at the consent of the 
shareholders, relieved of his position. This should be the objective of the regular 
evaluation and assessment exercise carried out by the board. A sound accountability 
structure where each individual director is answerable to the shareholders for his conduct 
and activities on the board will go a long way in instilling a sense of responsiveness in 
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each director and will help stave off passivity on the board. The involvement of 
shareholders acts as a check on board and managerial activities. 
 
After Enron, many came to have serious doubts about the ability of directors of many 
leading companies.224At the same time, the responsibilities, liabilities and expectations 
from directors began to increase. Just as public trust in director abilities took a downward 
spin, so also did the expectations of the public from directors begin to rise. The public 
began to demand more active and effective performance from directors just as 
shareholders also demanded accountability from their elected agents. Much of the blame 
for the manifold corporate collapses was laid at the doorstep of the board of 
directors.225Many boards have been identified as passive and ineffective. One of the 
major factors that contributed to these collapses was lack of independence on the 
boards.226To strengthen board and director independence, various structural best practices 
have been widely recommended such as separation of the position of CEO from that of 
Chairperson of the board, appointment of a lead independent director etc. However, it is 
also recommended that boards put in place a mechanism whereby independent directors 
can meet regularly without management present. Also there should be a procedure 
whereby the board can seek independent professional advice where necessary. In 
addition, the re-election of independent directors should not be made automatic, but 
subject to favourable performance evaluation, and the decision of the shareholders.227 
These are only some practical steps that can, if adopted, facilitate increased independence 
and effectiveness on the board. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The first part of this study consists of a comparative analysis of varying definitions of 
independent director contained in corporate governance codes and instruments from 
particular countries. These definitions differ in structure and in content. Most of the 
                                                 
224
. Oliver Williams, op cit note 155 P.9. 
225
. Gerald Acquoah-Gaisie, op cit note 14 P.1. 
226
. Acquoah-Gaisie op cit note 14 P.6. 
227
. Some of these mechanisms have already been recommended in some corporate governance guidelines. 
  
60 
definitions have adopted a more formalised approach to independence, by focusing on a 
structured set of criteria by which independence can be measured. Some others have 
focused more on the individual director and those inherent characteristics and attributes, 
such as integrity, professionalism etc which help to assure the individual director 
objectivity and professional judgement required for vigilant corporate monitoring and 
leadership. The opinion is that an independent director must not only find himself 
formally in the right position but must also possess some “extra individual quality” 
beyond the criteria required in the corporate governance codes and recommendations.228 
 
The second part of this study took a close look at the relevance and value of this class of 
directors to corporate performance. As this study has shown, evidence of the impact of 
independent directors on corporate performance is inconclusive. While some studies 
report a positive impact, especially with regard to specific board tasks, others report that 
there is no positive evidence of the impact of the independent director on corporate 
performance. Despite the conflicting evidence, this study has tried to establish that the 
value or relevance of the independent director to the modern corporate leadership is 
critical, and cannot be overemphasised. Indeed the existence of this class of directors has 
now become conventional wisdom. They are, or ought to be, the custodians or 
gatekeepers of the corporation, because they are the link between the owners of the 
corporation (shareholders) and the managers of the corporation. The role of the 
independent director can therefore be summed up as being to provide objective and 
disinterested monitoring of management and ensuring that corporate executives and 
managers account to shareholders about the day to day management of the company. 
Future research and studies in this area should therefore focus on how best to enhance the 
effectiveness of the independent director, especially in the increasingly dynamic global 
corporate environment.   
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APPENDIX: 
 
DEFINITIONS OF INDEPENDENT DIRECTOR 
 
KING’S CODE, SOUTH AFRICA 
 
An Independent Director is a non-executive director who: 
 
- Is not a representative of a shareowner who has the ability to control or 
significantly influence management; 
 
- Has not been employed by the company, or the group, of which it currently forms 
part, in any executive capacity for the preceding three financial years; 
 
- Is not a member of the immediate family of an individual who is, or has been in 
any of the past three financial years, employed by the company or the group in an 
executive capacity; 
 
- Is not a professional advisor to the company or the group, other than in a director 
capacity; 
 
- Is not a significant supplier to, or customer of the company or group; 
 
- Has no significant contractual relationship with the company or group; and  
 
- Is free from any business or other relationship that could be seen to materially 
interfere with the individual’s capacity to act in an independent manner. 
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CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE, AUSTRALIA 
 
An independent director is a non-executive director (ie is not a member of management) 
and: 
 
- Is not a substantial shareholder of the company or an officer of, or otherwise 
associated directly with, a substantial shareholder of the company; 
 
- Within the last three  years has not been employed in an executive capacity by the 
company or another group member, or been a director after ceasing to hold any 
such employment; 
 
- Within the last three years has not been a principal of a material professional 
adviser or a material consultant to the company or another group member, or an 
employee materially associated with the service provided; 
 
- Is not a material supplier or customer of the company or other group member, or 
an officer of or otherwise associated directly or indirectly with a material supplier 
or customer; 
 
- Has no material contractual relationship with the company or another group 
member other than as a director of the company; 
 
- Has not served on the board of for a period which could, or could reasonably be 
perceived to, materially interfere with the director’s ability to act in the best 
interests of the company; 
 
- Is free from any interest and any business or other relationship which could, or 
could reasonably be perceived to. 
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THE COMBINED CODE, UK 
 
In determining whether a director is independent, the board must consider whether such 
director has been; 
 
- Has been an employee of the company or group within the last five years; 
- Has, or has had within the last three years, a material business relationship with 
the company either directly, or as a partner, shareholder, director or senior 
employee of a body that has such a relationship with the company; 
 
- Has received or receives additional remuneration from the company apart from a 
director’s fee, participates in the company’s share option or a performance-related 
pay scheme, or is a member of the company’s pension scheme; 
 
- Has close family ties with any of the company’s advisers, directors or senior 
employees; 
 
- Holds cross-directorships or has significant links with other directors through 
involvement in other companies or bodies; 
 
- Represents a significant shareholder; or 
 
- Has served on the board for more than nine years from the date of their first 
election.  
 
 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE, FRANCE 
 
The criteria to be reviewed to determine whether a director can qualify as independent are 
the following: 
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- Not to be an employee or corporate officer of the corporation, or an employee or 
director of its parent or a company that it consolidates, and not having been in 
such a position for the previous five years; 
 
- Not to be a corporate officer of a company in which the corporation holds a 
directorship, directly or indirectly, or in which an employee appointed as such or 
a corporate officer of the corporation (currently in office or having held such 
office going back five years) is a director; 
 
- Not to be a customer, supplier, investment banker or commercial banker: 
                     - that is material for the corporation or its group; 
                     - or for a significant part of whose business the corporation or its group 
accounts; 
 
- Not to be related by close family ties to a corporate officer; 
 
- Not to have been an auditor of the corporation within the previous five years; 
 
- Not to have been a director of the corporation for more than twelve years. 
 
 
NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE RULES 
 
- A director who is an employee, or whose immediate family member is an 
executive officer, of the company is not independent  until three years after the 
end of such employment relationship; 
 
- A director who receives, or whose immediate family member receives, more than 
$100,000 per year in direct compensation from the listed company, other than 
director and committee fees and pension or other forms of deferred compensation 
for prior service (provided such compensation is not contingent in any way on 
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continued service), is not independent until three years after he or she ceases to 
receive more than $100,000 per year in such compensation. 
 
- A director who is affiliated with or employed by, or whose immediate family 
member is affiliated with or employed in a professional capacity by, a present or 
former internal or external auditor of the company is not “independent” until three 
years after the end of the affiliation or the employment or auditing relationship; 
 
- A director who is employed, or whose immediate family member is employed, as 
an executive officer of another company where any of the listed company’s 
present executives serve on that company’s compensation committee is not 
“independent” until three years after the end of such service or the employment 
relationship; 
 
- A director who is an executive officer or an employee, or whose immediate 
family member is an executive officer, of a company that makes payments to, or 
receives payments from, the listed company for property or services in an amount 
which, in any single fiscal year, exceeds the greater of $1 million, or 2% of such 
other company’s consolidated gross revenues, is not “independent” until three 
years after falling below such threshold. 
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